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ARTICLE
ATTACK OF THE CLONES:
AN EXAMINATION AND CRITIQUE OF FDA's
MEDICAL DEVICE REGULATORY SCHEME
William Chanes Martinez*
ABSTRACT

In the 43 years since the enactment of the Medical Device
Regulation Act of 1976 (MDRA), the United States has
devolved into a public health crisis emergency regarding
medical device safety. Over the last decade, faulty or
flawed medical devices have injured 1.7 million and
killed nearly 83,000 people nationwide. This paper will
argue that the country's current medical device safety
crisis is directly tied to the United States Food and Drug
Administration's (FDA) inadequate regulation of those
products, the agency's inadequate pre-market approval

(PMA) process, corporate abuse of the FDA 510(k)
pathway, and the FDA's failure to engage in post market
surveillance andenforcement that ensures the safety of the
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medical devices that it approves/clears. This paper
reviews the major medical device regulatory oversight
reforms that scholars have proposed over the last several
decades and provides its own novel recommendations.
Due to the recent enactment of the 21st Century Cures Act
and the current Administration's pro-deregulation
posture, our medical device safety crisis is likely to
continue to worsen unless reforms are enacted that
demand that the FDA live up to its mission of protecting
and advancing the public health.
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Introduction
At eight

months

old,

Bella

Aguilar began

experiencing the symptoms of epilepsy. 1 Bella's parents

gave their child six different medications and even
considered corrective brain surgery to mitigate her
condition. 2 When Bella's doctor recommended Vagus
Nerve Stimulation (VNS) therapy, however, her life
changed. 3
VNS Therapy is delivered through a medical
device implanted under the chest skin via a wire that is
wound around the vagus nerve in the neck. 4 The device
sends mild pulses to the vagus nerve at regular intervals
throughout the day to prevent seizures. 5 Today, Bella "is
thriving in everything from academics to sports." 6 Just 13
years old, Bella takes college-level courses, is a four-sport
athlete, and mentors special needs children.7
1 Girl Once Known as "Miracle Baby" Meets Medical Device
Team Who Saved Her Life, ABC13 HOUSTON, https://abc13
.com/5628462/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2019) [hereinafter ABC13
Houston].

2 Id.
3 Id.
4 LivaNova, How It Works, VNS THERAPY (Oct. 20, 2019, 1:50
PM), https:/us.livanova.cyberonics.com/learn-more/how-it-wor
ks; Patricia

O. Shafer and Patricia M. Dean, Vagus Nerve

Stimulation (VNS), EPILEPSY FOUND. (Oct. 20, 2019, 1:50 PM),
https ://www. epilepsy. com/learn/treating-seizures-andepilepsy/devices/vagus -nerve-stimulation-vns.

5 Id.
6 ABC13 Houston, supra note 1.
7 Id.
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Bella's story is a testament to the modern-day
miracles that are medical devices. These devices impact
the lives of literally millions of Americans every day. The
United States is the largest medical device market in the
world, constituting 40 percent of worldwide device
revenue and sales, which amounted to $156 billion in
2017.8 By 2023, the U.S. medical device market is
projected to grow to $208 billion in annual sales and
revenue. 9 About 32 million Americans-or about 1 in

10-have an implanted medical device like Bella.10
Yet, not everyone who has been prescribed a
medical device ends up as fortunate as Bella. United
States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) data reveals
that more than 80,000 deaths and 1.7 million injuries
have been linked to medical devices in the past decade."
For example, in 2006, Stephen Tower, an orthopedic
surgeon, required a hip replacement. 12 He requested that
his surgeon provide him a metal-on-metal hip, the ASR
XL, which is manufactured by Johnson & Johnson.1 3
After his hip replacement procedure, Dr. Tower suffered
a series of complications and was forced to undergo a

8 International Trade Administration (ITA), Medical
Technology Spotlight, SELECT USA (Oct. 20, 2019, 1:56 PM),
https://www. selectusa. gov/medical-technology-industryunited-states.
9 Id.
10 Jeanne Lenzer, Can Your Hip Replacement Kill You?, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 20, 2019, 1:59 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/2018
/01/13/opinion/sunday/can-your-hip-replacement-killyou.html.

II Sasha Chavkin, The Implant Files Sparked Reform Around
the World. Here's Why We're Still Reporting., INT'L
CONSORTIUM OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS

(Nov. 5, 2020,

12:30 PM), https://www.icij.org/investigations/implant-files/th
e-implant -files -sparked-reform-from -around-the-world-hereswhy-were-still-reporting/.
12 Lenzer, supra note 10.

13 Id.

[347]
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follow-up surgery to remove the ASR XL hip implant. 14
During the implant removal surgery, Dr. Tower's surgeon

discovered that his hip was black and appeared to be full
of dirty oil.15 The ASR XL hip implant had leaked cobalt
into Dr. Tower's hip joint, which destroyed his hip
muscles, tendons, ligaments, as well as injured his heart
and brain. 16
At the time of Dr. Tower's hip implant surgery,

the FDA designated metal-on-metal hips, like the ASR
XL, as Class II medical devices under the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FDCA). 17 Class II
devices receive far less FDA pre-market scrutiny under
the FDCA's regulatory scheme than Class III devices. 18
Under FDA's 510(k) pre-market medical device
"clearance" process, the vast majority of Class II devices
make it to market so long as they are "substantially
equivalent to a predicate device" that FDA has already
cleared or approved for sale. 19 Under the 510(k) process,
FDA rarely inspects device manufacturing facilities or

14
1d.
15

1d.

16 Id.

17 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399d (2018).
18 See Metal-on-Metal Hip Implants: The FDA's Activities, U.S.
FOOD

&

DRUG

ADMIN.,

https://www.fda.gov/medical-

devices/metal-metal-hip-implants/metal-metal-hip-implantsfdas-activities (last visited Oct. 20, 2019) [hereinafter FDA
Activities]; Class 2 Device Recall DEPUY ASR XL
ACETABULAR CUP SYSTEM, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,

https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfRes/res.cf

m?id=96142 (last visited Oct. 20, 2019).
19 Diana Zuckerman et al., Lack of PubliclyAvailable Scientific
Evidence on the Safety and Effectiveness of Implanted Medical
Devices, JAMA INTERN MED. (Oct. 20, 2019, 2:18 PM),

https://jamanetwork.com/journals/j amainternalmedicine/fulla
rticle/1910556.

[348]
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requires device manufacturers to conduct clinical trials
before it clears a device for market distribution. 20
In January 2013, FDA reclassified metal-on-metal
hips as Class III devices, which required metal-on-metal
hip implant manufacturers to immediately stop
marketing their devices. 2 1 The reclassification further
demanded that such manufacturers submit pre-market
approval (PMA) applications to FDA before placing their
metal hip implant devices back on the market. 22 The FDA
PMA process requires a device manufacturer to present
sufficient valid scientific evidence to the FDA to
reasonably assure the agency that the device is safe and
effective for its intended use. 23
Johnson & Johnson recalled the ASR XL metalon-metal hip implant in 2010, but it continued to sell a
similar metal hip implant, the Pinnacle, until 2013.24 In

May 2019, Johnson & Johnson agreed to a $1 billion
settlement to resolve thousands of lawsuits that alleged
that the company's Pinnacle metal-on-metal hip implant
devices were defective. 25 More than 6,000 patients filed
claims against Johnson & Johnson contending that
defects in their Pinnacle implants left them unable to
walk and in pain. 26 The lawsuits further argued that

Id.; see INST. OF MED., Medical Devices and the Public's
Health: The FDA 510(k) Clearance Process at 35 Years (2011)
[hereinafter IOM].
21 FDA Activities, supra note 18.
22 FDA Activities, supranote 18.
23 FDA Activities, supranote 18.
24 Barry Meier, Maker Drops Hip Device, Then Warns of
20

Failures,N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/

2010/03/10/business/l0device.html.
25 Jef Feeley, J&J Pays About $1 Billion to Resolve PinnacleHip Suits, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 20, 2019, 2:30 PM), https:
//www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-07/j -j-said-to-

pay-about- 1-billion-to-resolve-pinnacle-hip-suits.
26

Id.

[349]
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Johnson & Johnson had purposely misled the public
about the implants' health risks and durability. 27
Even when the FDA subjects a medical device to
pre-market clinical trials, the agency sometimes ignores

the risks those studies detect. 28 In 1997, Cyberonics filed
a pre-market application seeking FDA approval of its

VNS therapy medical device. 29 After completing clinical
trials, an FDA adviser raised concerns about the high
death rate associated with the device. 30 The FDA
nonetheless approved VNS for market distribution with
the condition that Cyberonics conduct post-market safety
studies on the device. 3 1 FDA also failed to require
Cyberonics to inform patients about the device's
mortality risks. 32

Cyberonics submitted five post-market studies to
the FDA demonstrating the device was safe. 3 3 The
company did not, however, submit device-related death
data to the FDA. 34 This is because the FDA did not
require Cyberonics to count such deaths in its postmarket studies.3 5
In 2006, Cyberonics filed an application that
sought FDA approval to use the VNS Therapy device to
treat depression. 36 FDA convened an external third party

27 Id.
28 Lenzer, supra note 10.
29

Id.

30 Id.
31iId.
32 Id.
33Id.

34 Id.
35
Id.
36 Gardiner Harris, Device Won Approval Though F.D.A. Staff
Objected, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 20,
2019, 2:34 PM),
https://www. nytimes.com/2006/02/ 17/politics/device-wonapproval-though-fda-staff-objected.html; see also Top FDA
Official Approves Medical Device Despite Lack of Efficacy,
UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (Oct. 20, 2019, 2:34 PM),

[350]
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committee to evaluate Cyberonics' application and that
committee determined that the device had not proved
effective in treating depression during clinical trials. 37
During one such trial, Cyberonics implanted the device
in 235 depressed patients and activated the machines in
half of them. 38 After three months, the two groups were
equally depressed and the trial had failed.3 9
In a second trial, Cyberonics activated the VNS
devices in all 235 study subjects and determined that 30
percent showed significant improvement after six or
more months. 40 Without a control group, however, it was
impossible to determine if the device had actually
improved depression in patients. 4 1 The external
committee unanimously recommended that FDA deny
the Cybertronics application. 42 The FDA, however,
ignored the committee's recommendation and approved
the VNS Therapy device to treat depression. 43
The Cyberonics and Johnson & Johnson
controversies are examples of how the FDA enables
device manufacturers to treat the American public like
guinea pigs. As John Oliver, the host of the late-night
comedy show Last Week Tonight put it, "[N]obody wants
to be treated like a guinea pig unless it means you get
your own hanging water bottle that you can suck on from
your bed. Which actually sounds completely delightful.
"44

https://www. ucsus a. org/resources/top-fda-official-approvesmedical-device-despite-lack-efficacy [hereinafter UCS].
37

Id.

38 Id.

39 Id.

40 Id.
41
42

Id.

UCS, supra note 36.
43 Harris, supra note 36.
44 LastWeekTonight, Medical Devices: Last Week Tonight with
John Oliver (HBO), YoUTUBE (June 3, 2019), https://www.

youtube.com/watch?v=-tldzNlExrw.
[351]
8

ATTACK OF THE CLONES 15 TENN. J.L. & POL'Y

344 (2021)

The United States is in the midst of a faulty
medical device public health crisis. The crisis is directly
tied to the FDA's lax regulation of medical devices, the
agency's inadequate pre-market approval (PMA) process,

corporate abuse of the 510(k) pathway, and the FDA's
failure to engage in post-market surveillance and
enforcement that ensures the safety of the medical
devices that it approves/clears.

This paper proposes

various reforms designed to mitigate these problems.
This paper proceeds in four parts. Part I discusses

the current regulatory structure that applies to medical
devices and provides a history of FDA's regulatory
authority before and after the enactment of the Medical
Device Amendments (MDA) of 1976.45 Part II highlights
examples of the country's current medical device public
health crisis. Part III provides an overview of a number

of proposals to reform FDA's oversight of medical devices.
Part IV concludes with a number of novel
recommendations that, if adopted, would ensure the FDA
lives up to its mission to protect and advance the public
health.
I.

FDA's Current Regulatory Structure for

Medical Devices

This Part of the paper provides a broad overview
of FDA's current regulatory structure applicable to
medical devices. It begins with a brief history of
American medical device regulation. It then details the
FDA's medical device classification system. This Part
concludes by examining the FDA's medical device
marketing application scheme and evaluating the
agency's post-market medical device requirements.
A. Historical Development
Medical Device Regulation

of Medical

of

45 21 U.S.C. § 360(c)-(k) (2018).

[352]
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i. Pre-1976
Prior to the twentieth century, the federal
government had no authority to regulate drugs and
medical devices, and drug and medical device
manufacturers had no obligation to ensure the safety or
efficacy of their products. 46 The FDA's oversight of food
and drugs commenced in 1906 when President Theodore
Roosevelt signed into law the Pure Food and Drugs Act
(PFDA). 47 The new statute gave the precursor to today's
FDA the power to regulate drugs, but not medical
devices.48
Specifically,
the
PFDA criminalized
the
manufacture of "misbranded drugs." 49 The statute
defined a "misbranded drug" as one bearing false or
misleading statements regarding its identity, strength,

quality, purity, or ingredients.5 0 The Supreme Court

limited FDA's regulatory power under the Act by
construing this provision as not aimed at false curative
or therapeutic statements." 5 1 Therefore, manufacturers
were liable for false claims about a drug's ingredients but
not for false statements about its therapeutic effects. 52

Kyle Lennox, Note, Substantially Unequivalent: Reforming
FDA Regulation of Medical Devices, 2014 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1363,
1370 (2014).
47 Pure Food and Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768
(1906) (repealed 1938).
48 Id.; see A History of Medical Device Regulation & Oversight
in the United States, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,

https://www.fda. gov/medical-devices/overview-deviceregulation/history-medical-device-regulation-oversight

-

46

united-states (last visited Oct. 17, 2019).
49 Pure Food and Drug Act,

§ 1, 34. Stat. at 768.

Pure Food and Drug Act, § § 7-8, 34. Stat. at 769-70.
51 See United States v. Johnson, 221 U.S. 488, 497 (1911).
5
2 Spenser F. Powell, Changing OurMinds: Reforming the FDA
Medical Device ReclassificationProcess, 73 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
177, 182 (2018).
50

[353]
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The Elixir Sulfanilamide disaster in the late
1930s provoked federal legislative reform. 53 In 1937, a
new liquid form of sulfanilamide, a drug that "had been
used safely for some time in tablet and powder form" in
treating streptococcal infections, killed more than 100
people. 54 The manufacturer of Elixir Sulfanilamide was
unaware that one of the chemicals it used to liquify the
drug was a deadly poison. 55 The PFDA did not require
manufacturers to conduct pre-market pharmacological
efficacy and safety studies or submit to other pre-market
approval processes.56

Congress passed the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act of 1938 (FDCA) in response to the sulfanilamide
crisis and in an attempt to address these gaps in the
PFDA. 57 The FDCA was the first federal statute that
required pre-market drug safety testing. 58 The statute
prohibited drug manufacturers from introducing any
"new drug" into the market without first submitting an
application
to
the
FDA
containing
evidence
demonstrating that the drug was safe for use. 59 The
FDCA technically granted FDA the authority to regulate
medical devices but limited that oversight "to ensuring
that devices were not adulterated or misbranded." 6 0
Over the next four decades, medical devices were
largely unregulated in the United States.6 1 In 1962,

53 Carol Ballentine, Taste of Raspberries, Taste of Death: The
1937 Elixir Sulfanilamide Incident, FDA CONSUMER MAG.
(June 1981), https://www.fda.gov/files/about%20fda/publish

ed/The-Sulfanilamide-Disaster.pdf.
5

4 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57

21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399f (2018).
58 Id.
59 21 U.S.C. § 505(a)-(b) (2018).
60 Burgunda V. Sweet et al., Review of the Processes for FDA
Oversight of Drugs, Medical Devices, and Combination
Products, 17 J. MANAGED CARE PHARMACY 40, 40 (2011).
61 See Powell, supra note 52, at 185.

[354]
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Congress amended the FDCA to permit the FDA to
regulate certain devices, like contact lenses, by
classifying them as "drugs."62 The majority of medical
devices, however, remained unregulated prior to market
entry.6 3 The FDA attempted to supplement this gap with

service announcements warning the public about unsafe
medical devices that were on the market. 64 Congress
finally granted FDA regulatory control over medical
devices by passing the Medical Device Amendments of
1976 (MDA). 65
ii. Post-1976
Much like the FDCA, Congress passed the MDA
in response to a public health controversy.6 6 In 1970, A.H.
Robins Company began marketing the Dalkon Shield. 67

§ 301 et seq.; see also United States v. An Article
of Drug . . . Bacto-Unidisk . . ., 394 U.S. 784, 798 (1969)
(affirming regulation of devices under the 1962 Amendments
because Congress intended the term "drug" to have a meaning
"broader than any strict medical definition").
63 James M. Flaherty, Jr., Defending SubstantialEquivalence:
An Argument for the Continuing Validity of the 510(k)
PremarketNotificationProcess, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 901, 904
(2008).
64 LastWeekTonight, supra note 40 (explaining that "there are
some [devices] as phony as a $3 bill, like this Zehra applicator,
for example, which has claimed to cure arthritis with z rays.
There are no z rays.").
65 Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90
Stat. 539 (1976) (hereinafter MDA).
66 Congressional debate over the MDA focused heavily on the
harm caused by the Dalkon Shield controversy. See also, e.g.,
S. REP. NO. 94-33, at 1 (1975) ("[M]any of the deaths and much
of the illness attributed to this device could have been
prevented if medical device legislation . . . had been in effect
when the Dalkon shield was developed.").
62 21 U.S.C.

67 Carol Krismann, Dalkon Shield, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,

https://www.britannica.com/science/Dalkon-Shield
d Nov. 10, 2019).

(last visite

[355]
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A contraceptive intrauterine device, the Dalkon Shield
was purported to be safer than other birth control
alternatives. 68 Yet, the device was responsible for a high
number of inflammatory pelvic infections, uterine
perforations, and spontaneous septic abortions, as well as
at least four deaths. 69
The Dalkon Shield crisis prompted the enactment
of the MDA, which granted the FDA pre-market
regulatory authority over medical devices. 70 The statute
defines a "device" as:
an instrument, apparatus, implement,
machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro

reagent, or other similar or related article
. . . intended for use in the diagnosis of
disease or other conditions, or in the cure,
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of
disease, in man . . . [or] intended to affect

.

the structure or any function of the body .
71

As discussed below, the MDA created a three-tiered
classification system for medical devices. 72 Furthermore,
the MDA established two ways that manufacturers can
seek market approval for a device: the Pre-market
Approval Process (PMA) and the Pre-market Notification
Process (commonly known as the 510(k) pathway). 73
Following the MDA, Congress passed the Safe
Medical Devices Act of 1990 (SMDA). 74 Among other
things, the SMDA extended to the FDA the authority to
68 Id.
69

Id.

21 U.S.C. § 360(c)-(k) (1976).
71 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (1976).
72 Powell, supra note 52, at 184.
73 See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a) (1976) (describing the three
classifications and corresponding levels of review).
74 Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-629, § 2(a),
104 Stat. 4511, 4512 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 21 U.S.C.).
70

[356]
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seek civil penalties, order device recalls, and temporarily
suspend PMA applications for medical devices. 75
Furthermore, the SMDA requires "device user facilities,"
like hospitals, and device manufacturers to report to the
FDA information that suggests that a device has caused
or contributed to a patient's death or injury. 76 Lastly,
with regard to the 510(k) pathway, the statute requires
manufacturers to demonstrate "substantial equivalence"
to a predicate device, that is, "that a proposed device has
the same intended use and technological characteristics
as a device already in the market," in order to be cleared
for sale and distribution.77
In an attempt to better calibrate the balance
between patient safety and the market demand for
innovative new products, Congress passed a trio of laws:
the FDA Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA), the
Medical Device User Fee and Modernization Act of 2002
(MDUFMA), and the FDA Safety and Innovation Act of

2012 (FDASIA). 78 The FDAMA sought to streamline the
medical device approval process by exempting most Class
I devices from the 510(k) pre-market notification
process. 79 The FDAMA also granted the FDA the
authority to exempt Class II devices from that process
when it is unnecessary to ensure safety and
effectiveness. 80
The MDUDMA authorized the FDA to require
user fees from device manufacturers to fund pre-market
and post-market review. 8 1 To ensure the timely review of
75

Id.;

see DAVID

REGULATION

G.

ADAMS, ET AL., FOOD AND DRUG LAW AND

554 (3d ed. 2015).

21 U.S.C. § 360i(b)(1)(A)-(B) (2012).
77 Powell, supra note 52, at 185.
78 Adams, supra note 75, at 554-55.
79 21 U.S.C. §§ 301, et seq. (2018).
76

80 Id.; Notice: Medical Devices; Exemptions from Premarket

Notification; Class II Devices, 63 Fed. Reg. 3142, 3143 (Jan. 21,
1998).
81 Adams, supra note 75, at 554.

[357]
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pre-market applications, the MDUDMA tied a portion of
the FDA's budget to a performance goal requirement for
the review of those submissions. 82 Finally, the FDASIA
reauthorized the FDA's authority to collect device
applicant or "user" fees and permitted the FDA to
reclassify devices by administrative order rather than by
regulation. 83

The 2016 21st Century Cures Act (Cures Act) is
the most recent law that governs the manufacture and
marketing of medical devices. 84 The Cures Act was
designed to expedite the FDA pre-market approval and
clearance process. 85 It empowered the FDA to permit a
manufacturer to demonstrate medical device safety and
effectiveness by the least burdensome appropriate means
necessary. 86 "Necessary" means the minimum required
information that would support an FDA determination
that a medical device application provides a reasonable
assurance of the device's safety and effectiveness. 87 The
Cures Act also eased regulatory requirements for safety
and effectives for certain Class I and Class II medical
devices.88

A. FDA's
Medical
System

Device

Classification

The FDA organizes medical devices into three
classes (e.g., Class I, II, III) based on the safety concerns

associated with the device and the level of control needed
82 Id.

83 Id.
84 21st Century Cures Act, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda. gov/regulatory-information/selectedamendments-fdc-act/21st-century-cures-act (last visited Nov.
10, 2020).
85
Id.
86 21 U.S.C. § 360e (2018).
87 Id.
88 Id.

[358]
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to provide the FDA with reasonable assurances of
the device's safety and effectiveness. 89 The following
subsections of this paper explain the particulars that
pertain to FDA's medical device classification system.
i. Class I: General Controls
Class I devices are medical devices that present
relatively few risks to human health or safety.9 0 The FDA
subjects Class I devices to the lowest level of regulatory
oversight because those devices: (1) are not purported to
be for use in supporting or sustaining human life or for a
use that is of substantial importance in preventing
impairment of human health; and (2) do not present a
potential, unreasonable risk of illness or injury.9 1 As a
result, a manufacturer's demonstration of compliance
with FDA general controls is sufficient to reasonably
assure the agency that the device is safe and effective. 92
General controls are "the basic provisions ...

that

provide the FDA with the means of regulating devices to
ensure their safety and effectiveness."9 3 They include the

FDA's requirements for facility registration, product
listing, maintenance of records, labeling, and adherence
to good manufacturing practices (GMPs), among other
things. 94 Examples of Class I devices include elastic
bandages, examination gloves, and certain hand-held
89 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1) (2012); see Powell, supra note 52, at
186.
90 Steve Kanovsky et al., The Medical Device
Approval Process,
in A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO FDA's FOOD AND DRUG LAW AND
REGULATION 211-13 (Kenneth R. Pina & Wayne L. Pines eds.,
6th ed. 2017).
91 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A) (2012).
92 21 C.F.R. § 860.3(c)(1) (2016) (defining Class I devices).
93 General Controls for Medical Devices, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/regulatory-contr
ols/general-controls -medical-devices#introduction (last visited

Nov. 10, 2020).
94 Kanovsky, supra note 90, at 213.
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surgical instruments. 95 The FDAMA exempts Class I
devices from the FDA's pre-market notification
requirements (510(k) pathway), except those "that are
intended for a use that is of substantial importance in
preventing the impairment of human health or that

present an unreasonable risk of injury or illness" such as
blood bank supplies, cannulas, and cardiovascular
surgical instruments. 96

ii. Class II: Special Controls
Class II devices are medical devices for which
"general controls alone are insufficient to ensure their
safety and effectiveness." 97 In addition to general
controls, therefore, Class II devices are subject to devicespecific special controls. 98 Special controls include,
among other things, performance standards, pre-market
data demands, post-market surveillance,
special
99
labelling requirements, and patient registries. Class II
devices include contact lenses, infusion pumps, powered
wheelchairs, and computed tomography (CT) scanners.10 0
The FDA requires the majority of Class II devices

to satisfy its 510(k) pre-market notification process.10 1
That process requires the manufacturer to notify FDA of
its intent to market a device that is "substantially
equivalent" to another device that FDA already has
cleared or approved for the market.1 0 2 The FDA may,
however, exempt a Class II device from pre-market
95 Id.
96

Kanovsky, supra note 90, at 214.

97

Id.

98

Id.

99 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B) (2018).
100 Powell, supra note 52, at 187.
101 Bonnie Scott, Oversight Overhaul: Eliminating the
Premarket Review of Medical Devices and Implementing a
Provider-CenteredPostmarket Surveillance Strategy, 66 FOOD
& DRUG L.J. 377, 378 (2011).
102 Kanovsky, supra note 90, at 227.
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notification on its own initiative or in response to a
petition from a device manufacturer.10 3
The FDA relies heavily on 510(k) substantialequivalence review to ensure the safety and effectiveness
of Class II devices.1 0 4 "A study of FDA 510(k) submissions
from 1996 to 2009 found that more than 80% of the
510(k)-cleared devices were classified as Class II"
devices, while only about 10% and 2% were Class I and
Class III devices, respectively.1 05 Moreover, the FDA

clears for marketing approximately 90% of the Class I
and II 510(k) pre-market notifications that it receives.10 6
This is concerning given that critics of the 510(k) process
contend that it is insufficient to ensure that new medical
devices are safe and effective for market distribution. 107
iii.Class III: Pre- Market Approval

Class III medical devices are devices that present
the highest potential risk to the public and, therefore, are
subject to the most stringent regulatory controls.1 08 In

addition to general and special controls, Class III devices
typically must receive pre-market approval by the FDA
to ensure their safety and effectiveness.109 Class III
devices are those that are either: (1) intended "for a use
103 Id.
104 IOM,

supra note 20, at 85.

105 Id.
106 U.S.

GOVT

ACCOUNTABILITY

OFF., GAO-09-190,

MEDICAL

DEVICES: FDA SHOULD TAKE STEPS TO ENSURE THAT HIGHRISK DEVICE TYPES ARE APPROVED THROUGH THE
STRINGENT PREMARKET REVIEW PROCESS (2009).
107

MOST

Powell, supra note 52, at 188; see, e.g., Jonas Zajac Hines et

al., Left to Their Own Devices: Breakdowns in United States
Medical Device Premarket Review, 7 Pub. Libr. Sci. Med. 1, 6
(2010) (arguing that FDA should strengthen premarket device
review by, inter alia, "insisting on higher scientific standards"
and "tightening the interpretation of 'same intended use"').
108 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C) (2018).
109 Kanovsky, supra note 90, at 214-15.
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.

in supporting or sustaining human life or for a use which
is of substantial importance in preventing impairment of
human health;" or (2) "[present] a potential unreasonable
risk of illness or injury."1 10 Further, medical "[d]evices
that were not available on the market before the
enactment of the Medical Device Amendments . .
(generally referred to as postamendments devices), are
automatically classified" as Class III devices, regardless
of their risks."' Examples of Class III devices include
pacemakers, breast and cochlear implants, and certain
surgical meshes.1 1 2

C. Medical Device Marketing Applications
FDA has designated two major ways medical
devices may enter the market: the Pre-Market Approval
Process (PMA) or the Pre-Market Notifications Process

(commonly known as the 510(k) pathway).1 1 3 First, the
PMA is the most stringent type of FDA device marketing
application.1 1 4 The applicant must support its PMA

application with valid scientific evidence that
demonstrates the safety and efficacy of the device for its
intended use.11 5 Second, device manufactures utilizing
the 510(k) pathway rely on "substantial equivalence" to
assure the FDA that its device is safe and effective, which
is much less stringent than PMA. 116
i. Pre- Market Approval Process

110 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C).
"1 Reclassification, U.S. FOOD

& DRUG ADMIN., https://www.
fda.gov/about-fda/cdrh-transparency/reclassification (last vis
ited Oct. 20, 2019).
112

Id.

113
11

Kanovsky, supra note 90, at 234.

115

Id.

4

Id.

at 235.

116 21 U.S.C.

§ 360(k) (2018); Kanovsky, supra note 90, at 227.
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The PMA is the most stringent type of FDA device
marketing

application.1 1

7

PMA applications typically

include extensive clinical trial results, bench trials,
laboratory studies, animal studies, and references to all
standards relevant to a device's safety and efficacy.1 1 8
PMA applications also "must contain a complete
description of the device and its components; a detailed
description of the methods, facilities, and controls used to
manufacture the device; the proposed labeling and
advertising literature; and any training materials."1 1 9
Upon receipt of a PMA application, the FDA
review process proceeds in four steps: (1) administrative

review of the application; (2) substantive review of the
application; (3) advisory committee review of the
application, where applicable; and (4) FDA's final
decision. 120 In other words, upon receipt of the PMA, the
FDA "performs an administrative and limited scientific
review to determine if the application is ready for
filing." 12 1 If the PMA meets those criteria, the FDA moves
on to conduct a substantive review of the submitted
clinical data and scientific evidence. 12 2 The FDA attempts
to complete its substantive review within 180 days. 12 3
Upon completion of its substantive review, the
FDA has the discretion to convene a third-party advisory
committee, which consists of a panel of external
clinicians, to evaluate the PMA application. 124 The
Kanovsky, supra note 90, at 235.
Thomas Reuters Westlaw, FDA Medical Devices
Regulations PracticeNote ¶ 7-613-9907 (2019), (https://www.
westlaw. com/7-6139907?transitionType=Default&context
Data=(sc. Default) &VR=3.0&RS=cblt 1.0&documentSection=co
_anchor_a609486) [hereinafter PracticeNote].
19 Kanovsky, supra note 90, at 235.
117
118

120

PracticeNote, supra note 118.

121

Id.

122 21 C.F.R. § 814.44 (2019).
123 Id.
124 Kanovsky, supra note 90, at 240.
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committee must hold a public meeting to review the
application. 125 There are times when FDA decides that a
device application does not warrant an advisory
committee review. 126 Specifically, FDA foregoes external
committee review when the agency determines that it (1)
understands without external evaluation the safety and
effectiveness issues pertinent to the medical device under
review and (2) is competent to address those issues. 127
FDA discretion whether to submit a PMA
application to external committee evaluation is of
relatively new vintage. The MDA initially required FDA
to convene an advisory panel to review all new Class III
devices. 128 In 1990, however, Congress amended the
MDA to give FDA broad discretion regarding PMA
application referral to an external committee. 129 The FDA
now may make such a referral on its own initiative or
"upon the request of an applicant unless the [agency]

.

finds that the information in the application . .
substantially
duplicates
information which has

previously been reviewed by a panel." 13 0 In 2017, the FDA

issued a guidance document reaffirming that advisory
panels are unnecessary if the device under review
presents issues already addressed by a previous panel. 131

125 21 C.F.R.

§ 814.44.

126 PracticeNote, supra note 118.
127 Id.

,

128 21 U.S.C. § 360e(c)(3) ("Upon receipt of an application ...
the Secretary shall refer such application to the appropriate
panel . . . for study and for submission . . . of a report and
recommendation

respecting

approval

of the

application,

together with all underlying data and the reasons or basis for
the recommendation.").
129

Id.

21 U.S.C. § 360e(c)(3).
131 Guidance for Industry and FDA Staff Procedures for
Meetings of the Medical Devices Advisory Committee, U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Sept. 1, 2017), https://www.fda.gov
/regulatory-information/search-fda-guidance

-

130
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Today, companies routinely include a rationale in
their device PMA applications as to why a panel review
is unnecessary. 132 If the FDA nonetheless convenes an
advisory panel, the panel conducts its review and then
submits a report to the FDA that includes its
recommendation as to whether the application should be
approved and the bases for its recommendation. 1 33 The
FDA is not bound by the committee's recommendation or
rationales. 134

If the evaluation of a PMA is favorable, the FDA
may issue either: (1) an approval order, which approves

the device for market; or (2) an approvable letter, which
conditionally approves the device so long as the applicant
satisfies additional requirements or submits additional
information.1 3 5 If the evaluation is unfavorable, on the
other hand, the FDA will either deny the application or
issue a not approvable letter, which details why the
agency denied the PMA and how the applicant can
address outstanding issues. 136
Once

the

FDA

approves

a

PMA,

a

device

manufacturer is required to submit a PMA supplement
application before making any change affecting the
safety or effectiveness of the device. 137 The FDA's
regulatory scheme defers to device manufacturers to
make the initial determination whether a proposed
change would affect the safety or effectiveness of the
documents/procedures -meetings -medical-devices -advisorycommittee.
132

PMA Advisory Panels:Do their Votes Matter?, FOOD & DRUG
LAW INST. (2019), https://www.fdli.org/2019/05/pma-advisorypanels-do-their-votes-matter/ (last visited Nov 10, 2019)
[hereinafter FDLI Report].
133

Id

134 Kanovsky, supra note 90, at 240.
135 21 C.F.R. § 814.44(d)-(f); Kanovsky, supra note 90, at 24041.
136 Kanovsky, supra note 90, at 240-41.
137

Id. at 243.
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device. 138 While the FDA has enumerated the types of
changes that could trigger a PMA supplement, the
agency does not define what constitutes a change that
affects safety or effectiveness. 139
PMA supplements typically do not require device
manufacturers to submit the same, detailed information
required for initial PMA applications. 140 Instead,
supplement applications are limited to information
necessary to assure FDA that the proposed device change
does not compromise the safety or efficacy of the existing
approved device. 14 1 Device manufacturers are not
required to submit a PMA supplement if: (1) the change
does not affect the device's safety or effectiveness, and (2)
the change is reported to the FDA in a post-approval
annual report as a condition of approval of the existing
device (e.g., an editorial change in labeling). 142
In 1998, the FDA discontinued publication of PMA
medical device approvals in the Federal Register. 143 The
138

21 C.F.R.

§ 814.39(a) (year) ("While the burden for

determining whether a supplement is required is primarily on

the PMA holder, changes for which an applicant shall submit
a PMA supplement include, but are not limited to, the following
types of changes if they affect the safety or effectiveness of the
device: (1) New indications for use of the device. (2) Labeling
changes. (3) The use of a different facility or establishment to
manufacture, process, or package the device. (4) Changes in
sterilization procedures. (5) Changes in packaging. (6) Changes
in the performance or design specifications, circuits,
components, ingredients, principle of operation, or physical

layout of the device.").
139 jd.

140MI.

141 Id.
142 PMA Supplements and Amendments, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN. (Oct. 20, 2019, 5:48 PM), https://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/premarket-approval-pma/pma-supplements-and-

amendments#overview.
143
Center for Devices and Radiological Health, PMA
Approvals, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Oct. 20, 2019, 3:17 PM),
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FDA now notifies the public of a PMA or supplement
approval decision by posting that information on the
FDA's Devices Approved website page, along with a

summary of the safety and effectiveness data upon which
the agency based those approvals. 14 4 However, the FDA's
website fails to include all relevant device safety and
efficacy information. For example, Cybertronics' initial
PMA for its VNS Therapy device, which is discussed
above, does not contain information on the device's safety
and effectiveness. 145 Furthermore, out of the first 100 of
227 PMA supplements Cybertronics filed for this one

device, only one supplement contained a summary of the
device's safety and effectiveness.1 46
Because of the amount of information that device
manufacturers are required to submit to the FDA in PMA
applications and throughout the review process, it takes
FDA a significantly longer amount of time to review
PMAs than it does 510(k) applications. 147 FDA's average
review time for a 510(k) application is 20 hours while the
agency spends approximately 1200 hours on a PMA
review. 148

Furthermore, the PMA process is vastly more
expensive for manufacturers than the 510(k) process. 149
A 2010 survey of over two hundred medical technology
companies in the United States found that the cost of
obtaining PMA approval was nearly $100 million, with

$75

million

spent on

FDA-related

activities

(and

http://www.fda. gov/medical-devices/device-approvals-denialsand-clearances/pma-approvals.
144 Id.

1 45 VNS THERAPYSYSTEMPMA, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,

https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfpma/pma
.cfm?id=P970003 (last visited Nov 10, 2019).
146
Id. (need specific supplement)
147 Powell, supra note 52, at 188.
14,9 See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 478-79 (1996).
149 Powell, supra note 52, at 201.

[367]
24

ATTACK OF THE CLONES 15 TENN. J.L. & POL'Y

344 (2021)

excluding any marketing costs). 150 The average cost to

manufacturers to obtain 510(k) clearance was $31
million, with $24 million spent on FDA-related
activities. 151 In Fiscal Year 2021, the standard fee for a

PMA is $365,657, in comparison to $12,432 for 510(k)
clearance. 152 As such, device manufactures are strongly
incentivized to pursue the 510(k) pathway. Given FDA's
high rate of 510(k) approvals, device manufacturers,
historically, have been successful in avoiding PMA.1 53
ii. 510(k) Pathway
When Congress first created the 510(k) pathway,
there was only one means by which device manufacturers
could seek clearance under this avenue. 154 In order to
qualify for the 510(k) pathway, a device had to be deemed
"substantially equivalent" to another device that FDA
had already cleared for market. 155 The FDA, however,
developed the "The New 510(k) Paradigm," which offers
device manufacturers three alternative approaches for
seeking 510(k) clearance, to streamline the evaluation of
510(k)s in 1998.156

150

Id. n.203.

151

Id.

152 Center for Devices and Radiological Health, Medical Device
User Fee Amendments (MDUFA), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.
(Oct. 1, 2020) http://www.fda.gov/industry/fda-user-fee-prog
rams/medical-device-user-fee-amendments-mdufa.
153 U.S. GOVT ACCT. OFF., MEDICAL DEVICES: FDA SHOULD
TAKE STEPS TO ENSURE THAT HIGH-RISK DEVICE TYPES ARE
APPROVED THROUGH THE MOST STRINGENT PREMARKET REVIEW

PROCESS,

GAO-09-190,

17

(Jan.

2009),

http://www.gao.

gov/assets/290/284882.pdf.

154 Kanovsky, supra note 90, at 227.

155 21 U.S.C. § 360(k); Kanovsky, supra note 90, at 227.
156 Kanovsky, supra note 90, at 231.
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Today, a device manufacturer may choose either
the Traditional 157 or Special 158 pathway to seek clearance
for their device under 510(k). 159 While not frequently

used, a device manufacture may also submit an
Abbreviated 510(k) application.16 0 If FDA determines
that the device is not a substantial equivalent, the device
manufacturer may, among other things, submit a second
510(k) application with new data or submit a PMA. 16 1
Lastly, the 510(k) Third Party Review Program allows
device manufacturers an alternative review process, in
which accredited Third Party Review Organizations are
allowed to review certain low-to-moderate risk medical
devices before they submit the device manufacturer's
application to the FDA for a final decision. 162

How to Prepare a Traditional 510(k), U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/premarket-notifi
cation-510k/how-prepare-traditional-510k (last visited Oct. 20,
2019).
158
How to Prepare A Special 510(k), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda. gov/medical-devices/premarket-notification510k/how-prepare-special-510k? (last visited Oct. 20, 2019).
157

159

510(k) Submission Programs, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.

https://www.fda. gov/medical-devices/premarket-notification510k/510k-submission-programs (last visited Oct. 20, 2019).
160 How to Prepare an Abbreviated 510(k), U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/premarket-notifi
cation-510k/how-prepare-abbreviated-510k (last visited Oct.
20, 2019); John Speer & Michael Dures, How To Use The
Abbreviated FDA 510(K) Pathway To Your Advantage,
GREENLIGHT GURU, https://www.greenlight.guru/blog/how-to-

use-the-abbreviated-fda-510k-pathway-to-your-advantage
(last visited Dec. 5, 2019) ("The abbreviated 510(k), which is
what we're talking about today, is only used about 2% of the
time. So, a very, very, small number of the overall 510(k)'s are
brought to the market as an abbreviate 510(k) . . .. ).
161 Kanovsky, supra note 90, at 233; Practical Note, supra note
118.
162 510(k) Third Party Review Program, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/premarket-subm
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1. Traditional 510(k)
The Traditional 510(k) process requires a
manufacturer to submit a pre-market notification
application to FDA and receive agency clearance before it
can commercially distribute certain new medical devices,
including most Class II devices.16 3 The burden is on the
device manufacturer to show that the new medical device
is substantially equivalent to a predicate device, that is,
a device that is already legally marketed. 164 Initially, the
MDA did not define "substantial equivalence," but the
statute's legislative history indicates that the FDA
should apply the term narrowly where necessary to
assure the safety and efficacy of the new device. 165 A
House committee report stated:
The Committee believes that the term
[substantially equivalent]
should be
construed narrowly where necessary to
assure the safety and effectiveness of a
device but not so narrowly where
differences between a new device and a
marketed device do not relate to safety and
effectiveness. . . . [D]ifferences between

new and marketed devices ... [that] would
have a bearing on ... a new device's safety
and effectiveness [would dictate that] such
[new] devices should be automatically
classified into class 111.166

issions/510k-third-party-review-program (last visited Oct. 20,
2019) [hereinafter Third Party Review].
16
3 Id.
164 Kanovsky, supra note 90, at 231.
165 IOM, supra note 20, at 223.
166

Id
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FDA deems a new device as "substantially
equivalent" to one or more predicate devices if the device
has: (1) the same intended use as the predicate and (2)
has either: (a) the same technological characteristics as
the predicate or (b) different technological characteristics
from the predicate that do not raise new questions of
safety and effectiveness.1 67 Initially, the FDA required
device manufacturers to provide proof of the new device's
equivalence to an actual pre-MDA device (i.e., one that
was on the market prior to MDA).168 The FDA now allows
device manufacturers to rely on post-MDA Class I or II

devices that are legally marketed or a legally marketed
Class III device for which FDA has not yet called for a
PMA application to satisfy its substantial equivalence
criteria. 169 As a result, the predicate device on which a
manufacturer relies in the 501(k) process no longer needs
to be a pre-MDA device. It cannot, however, be a device
that the FDA has recalled from the market or one that a
court has ruled is misbranded or adulterated. 170
Device manufacturers are required to use the
Traditional 510(k) process under the following
circumstances. 171 First, unless otherwise exempt, a
device manufacturer must utilize the Traditional
pathway if it seeks to introduce a medical device into the
market for the first time. 172 Second, a Traditional 510(k)
application is required when a manufacturer: (1) makes
a change to a cleared device that could significantly affect
the safety or efficacy of the device or (2) makes a major
modification to the intended use of a previously cleared

167

Kanovsky, supra note 90, at 227; Practical Note, supra note

118.
168 Kanovsky, supra note 90, at 228.
169 21 U.S.C. § 360c(I)(2); Kanovsky, supra note 90, at 228.
170 Kanovsky, supra note 90, at 231.
171 Id.
172 21 U.S.C. § 360(k); Kanovsky, supra note 90, at 227.
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device. 173 FDA requires the manufacturer to submit its
Tradition 510(k) notification at least 90 days prior to its
intended introduction of the device into the market. 174
"Preamendment devices" are exempt from the
Traditional 510(k) rule. 175 A preamendment device is a
medical device that was legally marketed in the U.S.
prior to the passage of the MDA and that has not been
significantly changed or modified since that time and for
which FDA has not required a PMA application. 176

Preamendment devices are "grandfathered," and,
therefore, are not subject to the Traditional 510(k)
application process. 177

2. Special 510(k) Submission
The Special 510(k) pathway is intended to
facilitate the submission, review, and clearance of a
proposed change to a manufacturer's existing device that
is already approved for market distribution through
510(k) clearance. 178 A device manufacturer may use the
Special 510(k) option if its proposed changes to the device
do not affect the device's intended use or alter its
fundamental scientific technology. 17 9 If the desired
changes do alter the device's intended use or its

21 C.F.R. § 807.81(a)(3)(i-ii); Kanovsky, supra note 90, at
227.
174 21 U.S.C. § 360(k).
175 Premarket Notification 510(k), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda. gov/medical-devices/premarketsubmissions/premarket-notification-510k (last visited Oct. 20,
2019) [hereinafter PremarketNotification].
176 Kanovsky, supra note 90, at 232.
173

177 Id.
178
Id.
179 The Special 510(k) Program, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,

https://www.fda.gov/regulatory-information/search-fdaguidance-documents/special-5 10k-program (last visited Oct.
20, 2019) [hereinafter Special 510(k)].
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fundamental scientific technology, the manufacturer is
required to submit a Traditional 510(k) application.18 0
The Special 510(k) pathway requires the device
manufacturer to inform the FDA that the new device
conforms to the design controls that attended to the
previously cleared device, but it does not require the
manufacturer to submit clinical data that ensures that
the device's change does not affect its safety or
effectiveness. 18 1 Design
controls
require
device
manufacturers to adhere to a set of procedures applicable
to the design and development of the medical device. 182
These controls aim to ensure that device specifications
achieve the device's intended use. 1 8 3

According to the FDA, such design control
procedures produce reliable results and, therefore, can
form the basis for a substantial equivalence
determination without compromising the statutory and
regulatory criteria for substantial equivalence. 184 "As
described by the FDA, 'a Special 510(k) provides an
efficient pathway for manufacturers to provide the
minimum required information necessary to establish
substantial equivalence for a modified device."'185 In
order to incentivize manufacturers to elect the Special
510(k) pathway, FDA has agreed to review such
applications within 30 days.
3. 510(k) Third Party Review Program

180

181

PremarketNotification, supranote 175.

Id.

182 Practical Note, supra note 118.
18

3 Id.

184

Id.

185 Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, FDA Finalizes Guidance
on Special 510(k) Pathway, JD SUPRA (Sep. 17, 2019),
https://www.j dsupra.com/legalnews/fda-finalizes-guidance-onspecial-510-k-32005/ [hereinafter WSGR] (citing How to
PrepareA Special 510(k), supra note 158).
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"The 510(k) Third Party Review Program provides

medical device manufacturers with a voluntary
alternative review process." Specifically, the program
permits accredited Third Party Review Organizations
(Third Parties) to review certain low-to-moderate risk
medical devices in lieu of FDA review. 186 FDA maintains
that this program streamlines the 510(k) process by
allowing the agency to "focus its resources on higher risk
devices, while still maintaining oversight of the review of
lower risk devices...."187

Under this program, manufacturers may submit
their 510(k) application directly to an accredited Third
Party rather than FDA. 188 FDA requires Third Parties to

use the same criteria as the FDA to review 510(k)
submissions. 189 After the Third Party completes its
review of the device, it sends a packet to the FDA, which
includes the manufacturer's original 510(k) submission
and the Third Party's recommendation whether the
device is substantially equivalent to a predicate device. 190
"The FDA makes the final determination on the Third
Party 510(k) submission." 19 1 Should the Third Party
reviewer

fail

to

appropriately

apply

the

criteria

applicable to a 510(k) submission, the FDA re-reviews all
or part of the manufacturer's 510(k) submission. 192
D. Post-Market Requirements

After the FDA approves or clears a device for
market distribution, it has at its disposal a number of
tools to assure that medical devices remain safe and

186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Id.

189

Id.
Id.
191 Id.
192
Id.
1 90
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effective. 193 First, the FDA may demand that device
manufacturers conduct post-market studies to collect
data on the safety and/or effectiveness of approved or
cleared medical devices. 194 Second, the FDA has
implemented a post-market Medical Device Reporting
(MDR)

system

"for

identifying,

monitoring,

and

capturing adverse events involving medical devices"195
Lastly, the FDA is authorized to recall or remove from
the market medical devices that pose a danger to public
health. 196
i. Post Market Studies

The FDA has the authority to demand that device
manufacturers conduct two different types of postmarket studies. 197 The FDA requires a manufacturer
perform the first type, the post-approval study, as a
condition of PMA approval. 198 Because the FDA cannot

identify all possible problems with a device during its
PMA review, these studies seek to monitor approved
devices through post-market clinical studies aimed at
assessing the long-term safety or effectiveness of a
device. 199
The FDA requires that a manufacturer conduct
the second type of post-market study, the Section 522
Post-market Surveillance Study, once a device is 510(k)

193 Bill Sutton, Overview of Regulatory Requirements: Medical
Devices - Transcript, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Nov. 2011),
https://www.fda. gov/training-and-continuing-education/cdrhlearn/overview-regulatory-requirements -medical-devicestranscript.
194 Id.
195
196

Id

Id.

197 Id.
198 Id.
199 Id
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cleared or PMA approved. 20 0 Section 522 Post-market
Surveillance Studies are triggered by devices that: (1) are
"reasonably likely to have a serious adverse health
consequence;" (2) are "expected to have significant use in
pediatric populations;" (3) are "intended to be implanted
in the body for more than 1 year;" or (4) are "lifesupporting device[s] [intended for] use outside of a user
facility," such as hospitals, ambulatory surgical facilities,
nursing homes, outpatient diagnostic facilities, or
outpatient treatment facilities. 20 1

ii. Adverse Reporting
The FDA has implemented a post-market Medical
Device Reporting (MDR)
monitoring, and capturing

system
adverse

"for identifying,
events involving

medical devices." 20 2 An adverse event occurs when a
device "may have caused or contributed to the death [or]
serious injury" of a patient. 20 3 The FDA requires device

manufacturers to file a MDR report with the agency
within 30 days of notice that any device may have caused
or contributed to a death or serious injury or has
malfunctioned and would be likely to cause or contribute
to a death or serious injury if a malfunction were to
occur. 20 4 FDA does not mandate medical device

200 Id.
201 Id.
202 Id.

21 C.F.R. § 803.20(c)(1) (2019) ("Any information, including
professional, scientific, or medical facts, observations, or
opinions, may reasonably suggest that a device has caused or
may have caused or contributed to an MDR reportable event.
An MDR reportable event is a death, a serious injury, or, if you
are a manufacturer or importer, a malfunction that would be
likely to cause or contribute to a death or serious injury if the
malfunction were to recur.").
2 04
Id.; § 803.56.
203
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distributors to report adverse events. 20 5 FDA does
demand, however, that "device user facilities," which
include hospitals, ambulatory surgical facilities, nursing
homes, outpatient diagnostic facilities, and outpatient
treatment facilities, file MDR reports with the device
manufacturer.206 A device user facility must file an MDR
if it receives information of an adverse event from
medical personnel who, in the course of their duties,
became aware of reportable issues with a medical
device. 20 7 FDA does not require user facilities to report
device malfunctions directly to the agency but they can
do so voluntarily. 208
The American Medical Association's (AMA) Code
of Medical Ethics requires physicians "to report
suspected adverse events resulting from the use of a ...
medical device." 209 Under the AMA ethics rules,
physicians have an ethical responsibility to "promptly
report serious adverse events . . . to the appropriate

regulatory agency."

2 10

The FDA, on the other hand,

205 Medical Device Reporting (MDR): How to Report Medical
Device

Problems,

U.S.

FOOD

&

DRUG

ADMIN.,

https://www.fda. gov/medical-devices/medical-devicesafety/medical-device-reporting-mdr-how-report-medicaldevice-problems#overview (last visited Oct. 20, 2019).

Kanovsky, supra note 90, at 231.
21 U.S.C. § 360i(b)(1).
208 21 C.F.R. § 803.20(c)(2) ("If you are a user facility, importer,
or manufacturer, you do not have to report an adverse event if
you have information that would lead a person who is qualified
to make a medical judgment reasonably to conclude that a
device did not cause or contribute to a death or serious injury,
or that a malfunction would not be likely to cause or contribute
to a death or serious injury if it were to recur. Persons qualified
to make a medical judgment include physicians, nurses, risk
managers, and biomedical engineers.").
209 Code of Medical Ethics Opinion 8.8, AM. MED. ASS'N,
https://www. ama-assn. org/delivering-care/ethics/requiredreporting-adverse-events (last visited Nov 30, 2019).
206
207

210

Id.
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exempts health professionals from reporting information
that suggests that a device may have caused or
contributed to a death or serious injury or has
malfunctioned. 211
Until recently, the FDA also permitted device
manufacturers to request an MDR filing exemption
pursuant to its Alternative Summary Reporting (ASR)

system. 2 12 Under this program, manufacturers could
submit quarterly summary reports of adverse events to
the FDA instead of filing those reports within the
required 30 days. 2 13 Unlike other MDRs that are publicly
available in FDA's Manufacturer and User Facility
Device Experience (MAUDE) database, the FDA did not

disclose the events reported under the ASR system to the
public. 2 14

Since 2016, manufacturers have reported at least
1.1 million device-related adverse events under the ASR
system instead of MAUDE. 2 15 While manufacturers did
report certain device-related deaths in MAUDE, they
submitted serious injury and malfunction reports related
to approximately 100 medical devices exclusively to the

211 21 U.S.C.

§ 360i(c)(1) ("Persons exempt. Subsection (a) shall

not apply to-- (1) any practitioner who is licensed by law to

prescribe or administer devices intended for use in humans and
who manufactures or imports devices solely for use in the
course of his professional practice.").
212 Dr. Jeffrey E. Shuren, Statement on Agency's Efforts to
Increase Transparencyin Medical Device Reporting, U.S. FOOD
& DRUG ADMIN. (June 21, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/news-

events/press-announcements/statement-agencys-efforts-

increase-transparency-medical-device-reporting.
213 Id.

214 Christina Jewett, Hidden FDA Reports Detail Harm Caused
by Scores of Medical Devices, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Mar. 7,

2019, 7:10 PM), https://khn.org/news/hidden-fda-databasemedical-device-injuries -malfunctions/.
215

Id.
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ASR system. 2 16 A study of more than a decade's worth of
MAUDE reports identified more than 1.7 million injuries
and nearly 83,000 deaths linked to a problematic medical
devices. 2 17 Given ASR's anonymity, there is no basis to
determine the number of injuries or deaths that it
captured over the years. 2 18
The FDA recently replaced the ADR system with
the Voluntary Malfunction Summary Reporting (VMSR)

Program. 219 VMSR reports are publicly available in the
MAUDE database. 220 The FDA also encourages-but

does not require-device manufacturers to report certain
device malfunctions in summary form on a quarterly
basis to VMSR. 22 1 FDA notes, "reports of death or serious
injury are not allowed to be submitted via the VMSR,"
however, the agency may still require individual reports
of device malfunctions. 22 2

iii. Recalls and Removals
The FDA is authorized to recall or remove from the
market medical devices that pose a danger to public
health. 223 Device manufactures, however, typically
voluntarily initiate recalls of their own products. 224 When
a device manufacturer learns that a medical device is
defective and poses a risk to public health, they must take
one of two steps: initiate corrective action or remove the
Ben Hallman, FDA Releases Vast Trove of Hidden Medical
Device Injury and Malfunction Reports, ICIJ (June 24, 2019),
https://www. icij. org/investigations/implant-files/fda-releasesvast-trove-of-hidden-medical-device-injury-and-malfunction216

reports/.
217 Id.
2 18

Id.

219 Shuren, supra note 212.
220 Id
221
222

Id.
Id.

223 Kanovsky, supra note 90, at 231.
224 Id
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product from the market. 22 5 Corrective actions attempt to
address problems with a medical device in the place
where it is used or sold, 226 while a removal action ensures
the product may no longer be used or sold. 227 On rare
occasion, when a device manufacturer fails to voluntarily
recall a defective product associated with significant
health problems or death, the FDA issues a recall. 228

Manufacturers are required to report all correction or
removal actions to the FDA. 2 2 9
II. The Problem
The manufacturing, distribution, and marketing of
unsafe or ineffective medical devices is not a new
phenomenon in the United States. 230 Yet, as technology
advances, device manufacturers are hyper-incentivized
to market new devices as quickly as possible-and before
potential competitors-by any means necessary. 2 31 The
225 What is a Medical Device Recall? U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.

(Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/medical[hereinafter FDA
device-recalls/what-medical-device-recall
Recall].
22
6 Id
227

Id.

228 21 C.F.R. § 810.
22
9 FDA Recall, supranote 224.
230 See The Editorial Board, 80,000 Deaths. 2 Million Injuries.
It's Time for a Reckoning on Medical Devices., N.Y. TIMES (May
4,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/04/opinion/sun

day/medical-devices.html ("In the past decade, nearly two
million injuries and more than 80,000 deaths have been linked
to faulty medical devices, many approved with little to no
clinical testing....").
231 Id. ("It's not solely those laws that give medical device
makers influence over regulators. The industry maintains a
well-oiled revolving door with the F.D.A. - as The Associated
Press has noted, the last four people to hold [the FDA
Commissioner] position have gone on to lucrative industry
gigs. Device makers also spent more than $300 million
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following stories illustrate

how the FDA's current

regulatory system prioritizes innovation over safety,

empowers device manufacturers to cut corners, and,
therefore, endangers public health.
A. Case Study: Transvaginal Mesh
In the 1970s, gynecologic and urologic surgeons

began to utilize surgical mesh to treat abdominal
hernias. 232 In 1996, the FDA cleared Boston Scientific's
ProtoGen Sling Device, a Class II transvaginal mesh
device, via the 510(k) pathway to treat stress urinary
incontinence. 233 Three years later, however, the FDA
recalled ProtoGen mesh because of a number of
complications involving the device, including its erosion
of vaginal tissue. 2 34 The FDA nevertheless allowed device
manufacturers to use ProtoGen mesh as a predicate
device to clear subsequent transvaginal mesh devices
that purported to treat pelvic organ prolapse (POP).235

POP occurs when the muscles that support the
pelvic organs, like the uterus and vagina, weaken over
time and cause the organs to bulge out of the vagina. 2 36
In recent years, doctors have used transvaginal mesh to
treat POP.237 Specifically, doctors have implanted
transvaginal mesh into the vagina to create a "bladder
lobbying Congress in the decade ending in 2017, according to
the Center for Responsive Politics.").
232 Carrie MacMillan, Transvaginal Mesh: What Women
Should Know, YALE MED.: STORIES (June 19, 2019),

https://www.yalemedicine.org/stories/transvaginal-mesh/.
233 Powell, supra note 52, at 178.
2 35

Id. at 178-79.

236 What to Do About Pelvic Organ Prolapse, HARv. MED. SCH.

(July 2, 2020), https://www.health.harvard.edu/womenshealth/what-to-do-about-pelvic-organ-prolapse.

237 C. Gavin Shepherd, TransvaginalMesh Litigation: A New
Opportunity to Resolve Mass Medical Device FailureClaims, 80
TENN. L. REV. 477, 477-78 (2013).
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sling" to help reinforce the weakened vaginal walls and
reduce the rate of POP.238

From 2005 to 2011, "[the] FDA received over 4,000
reports of adverse events attributable to transvaginal
mesh." 239 These devices caused thousands of women to
suffer: "Patients reported that bowel, bladder, and blood
vessel perforation, in addition to transvaginal mesh
erosion, had led to extreme pain and an overall decrease
in patient quality of life." 240 Gwyn Madsen, who was
implanted with a Boston Scientific transvaginal mesh
device, claimed that the device "felt like a cheese grater
inside of [her]."241 Disturbingly, researchers have
identified at least 61 medical devices that the FDA
cleared for market under the 510(k) pathway on the basis
of their "substantial equivalence" to the ProteGen mesh
device. 24 2 Worse yet, none of the manufacturers of those
61 devices submitted any clinical trial evidence in
238 Id.

239 Powell, supra note 52, at 179; see Daniel G. Schultz, FDA
Public Health Notification: Serious Complications Associated
with Transvaginal Placement of Surgical Mesh in Repair of
Pelvic Organ Prolapse and Stress Urinary Incontinence, U.S.
Food & Drug Admin. (Oct. 20, 2008), http://www.amiform

.com/web/documents-risques -op-coelio-vagi/fda-notificationabout-vaginal-mesh.pdf; Update on Serious Complications
Associated with TransvaginalPlacement of Surgical Mesh for
Pelvic Organ Prolapse:FDA Safety Communication, U.S. Food
& Drug Admin. (July 13, 2011), https://www.burgsimpson.

com/wp-content/uploads/20
18/03/FDA-safety-communication-pelvic-mesh.pdf.
240 Shepherd, supra note 237, at 480.
241 Scott Pelley, GynecologicalMesh: The Medical Device That
Has 100,000 Women Suing, CBS NEWS (Apr. 17, 2019),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/boston-scientificgynecological-mesh-the-medical-device-that-has-100000women-suing-2019-04-17/.
242 Carl J. Heneghan et al., Trials of Transvaginal Mesh
Devices for Pelvic Organ Prolapse: A Systematic Database
Review of the U.S. FDA Approval Process, 7 BMJ OPEN (2017),
https://bmjopen.bmj.com/content/7/12/e017125.
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support of the safety and efficacy of those devices prior to
FDA approval. 243

In 2016, the FDA reclassified transvaginal
medical devices from Class II to Class III devices. 24 4 As
part of that reclassification, the FDA required
transvaginal mesh device manufacturers to submit and
obtain PMA application approval to ensure that their
devices were safe and effective. 245 In response, Boston
Scientific submitted PMA applications seeking approval
for two of its transvaginal devices, the Uphold LITE
Vaginal Support System and the Xenform Soft Tissue
Repair System. 24 6 In order to allow those mesh devices to
stay on the market, the FDA demanded that Boston
Scientific submit evidence demonstrating that the
devices were more effective at treating POP than a
surgery to relieve the condition without the use of
mesh. 2 47 Boston Scientific failed to submit such data and,
243
244

Id

FDA Strengthens Requirements for Surgical Mesh for the

Transvaginal Repair of Pelvic Organ Prolapse to Address

Safety Risks, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Jan. 4, 2016),
http://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fdastrengthens -requirements -surgical-mesh-transvaginal-repairpelvic-organ-prolapse-address-safety.
245 Id.

246 FDA Takes Action to Protect Women's Health, Orders
Manufacturers of Surgical Mesh Intended for Transvaginal

Repair of Pelvic Organ Prolapse to Stop Selling All Devices,
U.S.
FOOD
& DRUG
ADMIN.,
(Apr.
16,
2019),
http://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fdatakes-action-protect-womens-health-orders-manufacturersFDA
[hereinafter
surgical-mesh-intended-transvaginal
CommissionerReport]. Boston Scientific was one of two device
manufacturers marketing transvaginal mesh to treat POP.
Coloplast, the other manufacturer, also failed to demonstrate
a reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness for its
devices. FDA, therefore, ordered Coloplast to stop selling its
devices. Id.
247

Id.
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in 2019, the FDA ordered the manufacturer to stop
selling the mesh. 248 In 2018 alone, Boston Scientific paid
over $600 million in settlement funds to resolve
thousands of lawsuits involving the harm caused by its
transvaginal mesh products. 249

B. Case Study II: Implantable Cardioverterdefibrillators

Implantable cardioverter-defibrillators (ICDs) are
small battery-powered medical devices. ICDs are
implanted under the skin and connected to the heart
through wire "leads" to keep track of an individual's heart
rate. 25 0 If the device detects an abnormal heart rhythm,
it delivers an electric shock to the heart to restore a
normal heartbeat. 25 1
In 1993, the FDA approved Medtronic's PMA
application for its Transvene ICD Lead System device. 25 2
A lead is a special wire that delivers energy from the ICD
to the heart muscle. 25 3 In 2005, Medtronic submitted a
2449 Id.
249 Boston Scientific Says 50K Mesh Settlements
Almost Final,
LAw360 (Feb. 20, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/
1130868/boston-scientific-says-50k-mesh-settlements-almostfinal.
250
Implantable CardioverterDefibrillator(ICD), AMER. HEART
ASS'N, https://www.heart.org/en/health-topics/arrhythmia/pr
evention--treatment -of-arrhythmia/

implantable-cardioverter-defibrillator-icd (last visited Nov 3,
2019).
251
252

Id.

U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Medtronic(R) Transvene Lead

System

PMA,

PREMARKET

APPROVAL

DATABASE

(2019),

https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfpma/pma
.cfm?id=P920015 (last visited Nov 3, 2019).
Pacemaker and ICD Lead Extraction, JOHN HOPKINS MED.,

2 53

https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/heart-vascularinstitute/co

nditions_treatments/treatments/pacemaker_icd_lead_extracti
on.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2019).
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PMA supplement to the FDA seeking approval of its
Medtronic Sprint Fidelis ICD Lead device on the basis of
the FDA's earlier approval of the Transvene ICD
device. 2 54 The FDA approved the Sprint Fidelis ICD Lead

device for market distribution within three months of
Medtronic's request and without any clinical trial data.2 55
Over the ensuing three years, practitioners
implanted 90% of Medtronic's ICD devices with the
Sprint Fidelis ICD Lead. 2 56 Medtronic, however, recalled
the Sprint Fidelis ICD Lead device in October 2007after it had been on the market for 38 months and used
in 268,000 worldwide implantations-because of its
propensity to fracture. 25 7 Medtronic cited to five Fidelis
Lead-related deaths during its device recall and
explained that fractures in the device's leads could cause
an ICD to fail to deliver a lifesaving shock or to even
shock the heart for no reason. 2 58 In 2010, Medtronic
agreed to pay $268 million to settle lawsuits involving the
Fidelis Lead device. 259

Medtronic Sprint Fidelis Leads Models 6949, 6948, 6931,
6930, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (2019), https://www.access

254

data.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfpma/pma.cfm?id=P920015S
032 (last visited Nov. 3, 2019) [hereinafter Fidelis PMA
Supplement].
255 Id.; see William H. Maisel, Semper Fidelis - Consumer
Protection for Patients with Implanted Medical Devices, 358
NEW ENG. J. MED. 985, 985-87 (2008).
256 Id
257 Id.

258 Barry Meier, Medtronic Links 13 Deaths to Faulty Heart
Device, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/

2009/03/14/business/14device.html;

see Physician Advisory

Letter (Oct. 15, 2007), MEDTRONIC, https://www.medtronic.

com/us -en/healthcare-professionals/products/productperformance/sprint-fidelis-physician-10-15-2007.html.
259
Medtronic to Settle Sprint Fidelis Defibrillator Suits, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 14, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/15/
business/15device.html.
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One study discovered that, from 1979-2012, FDA
approved 77 original and 5,829 supplement PMA
applications for cardiac implantable electronic devices,

including ICDs. 26 0 It further found that 79% of the 77
original PMA applications FDA approved during the

same period were the subject of at least one supplemental
application. 26 1 Thirty-seven percent of those FDAapproved supplements involved a change to the device's
design. 262 Moreover, in the vast majority of cases, the
FDA failed to demand any new clinical data related to
ICD

device

design

changes

prior

to

approval.2 6 3

Specifically, FDA only required new clinical data to
support the changed device's safety and effectiveness in
23% of the supplemental applications it approved from
2010-2012.264 Much like the role the 510(k) pathway
played in the transvaginal mesh debacle, the PMA
supplement pathway permitted FDA to approve and
deem safe many "change-design" ICDs without any
production or evaluation of new clinical data. 265
III. Proposed Reforms

This Part of the paper highlights a number of
proposed reforms to FDA's current regulatory structure
for medical devices. First, this Part will discuss a number
of reforms the FDA, and other commentators, have
proposed regarding the medical device approval and
clearance process. This Part then will examine
260 Benjamin

N.

Rome,

Daniel B.

Kramer

& Aaron

S.

Kesselheim, FDA Approval of CardiacImplantable Electronic
Devices via Original and Supplement Premarket Approval
Pathways, 1979-2012, 311 JAMA 385-391 (2014) [hereinafter
Rome].
261
Id. at 387.
262
Id. at 388.
26

3 Id

264
265

Id. at 385.
Id. at 389.
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additional, prevailing proposed reforms to FDA's medical
device pre-market review process.
A. Reforming 510(k) Pathway
In November 2018, the FDA released a report
detailing the improvements it has made to the 510(k)
program. 266 First, the agency implemented a refuse-to-

accept policy that applies to 510(k) submissions that fail
to satisfy the agency's quality threshold for review. 26 7
Simply stated, if a device manufacturer submits a 510(k)
application that fails to include one of the requisite items
for approval consideration, FDA now refuses to accept
that application for review. 268

Second, FDA issued new guidance concerning the
Special 510(k) Program in 2019.269 As the agency
explained, the program had been "limited to review of
changes that did not affect the device's intended use nor
alter the device's fundamental scientific technology." 2 70
The FDA, however, has shifted its focus to assessing
"whether the method(s) [a manufacturer uses] to
evaluate the change(s) are well-established, and whether
the results can be sufficiently reviewed in a summary or
risk analysis format." 2 71 Under the new guidance, the
FDA empowers device manufactures to self-regulate and
determine if additional testing is necessary to evaluate a
change that otherwise requires a Traditional 510(k)
FDA Has Taken Steps to Strengthen The 510(k) Program,
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Nov. 2018), https://www.fda.gov/
media/118500/download [hereinafter FDA 510(k) Report].
266

267

Id. at 5.

268 Id.

269 The Special 510(k) Program - Guidance for Industry and
Food and Drug Administration Staff, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN.
(Sept.
13, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/media/1
16418/download [hereinafter Special 510(k) Guidance].
270 Id. at 5.
271

Id. at 5-6.
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submission. 2 72 If the manufacturer determines that
additional testing is not necessary, it must submit to the
FDA a Special 510(k) application that includes a clear
rationale supporting that conclusion. 273

Third, the FDA is in the process of eliminating the
use of the 510(k) pathways for Class III devices. 2 74 The
FDA reports that it refused to clear any Class III device

via a 510(k) pathway in Fiscal Year 2018.275 The FDA
also is in the process of disincentivizing manufacturer
reliance on a 510(k) cleared device as a predicate for
510(k) pathway approval of a subsequent device when the
predicate device has raised safety concerns. 276 Since
1976, the FDA has eliminated the use of 1,758 devices as
predicates in the 510(k) pathway process. 277 The FDA has
eliminated 1,477 (84%) of those predicates since 2012.278

There are commentators that view the FDA's
510(k) pathway processes as adequate as they currently
stand. 279 James M. Flaherty, for example, has
characterized the 510(k) pathway as an appropriate
mechanism for reviewing medium-risk devices because it
achieves a worthy balance between protecting the public
health

through

pre-market

review

and

promoting

innovation and the timely introduction of new devices
into the market. 280 He also argues that, while the 510(k)
pathway process is not as rigorous as PMA review, it

succeeds in ensuring the safety and effectiveness of
certain medical devices through its use of the substantial
2 72

Id. at 10.

273 Id.

274 FDA 510(k) Report, supranote 266, at 7.
275 Id.
276
Id. at 8.
277

Id.

278 Id.

279 James M. Flaherty, Jr., Defending SubstantialEquivalence:
An Argument for the Continuing Validity of the 510(k)
PremarketNotificationProcess, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 901, 926-

27
(2008).
28
0

Id.
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equivalence standard.281 For support, Mr. Hall points to
an independent study, which evaluated 2005-2009 510(k)
pathway medical device submissions using FDA recall
data.282 That study found that: (1) over 99.5% of those
510(k) submissions did not result in a Class I safety
recall; (2) over 99.7% did not result in a Class I recall for

any reason relevant to the 510(k) pre-market system; and
(3) approximately 55% of all Class I recalls during the
study's timeframe involved problems or issues that arose
after market and, therefore, are not attributable to premarket approval systems or requirements. 283

Other
commentators,
however,
have
recommended that the FDA eliminate the 510(k)
pathway. 284 At the FDA's request, for example, the
Institute of Medicine (IOM) examined the 510(k) process
and recommended a number of reforms in 2011.285 Among
other things, the IOM report concluded that FDA should
eliminate the 510(k) process for at least two reasons. 286
First, the 510(k) process fails to adequately evaluate the
safety and effectiveness of medical devices because its
substitutes an independent and objective evaluation of a
device with the substantial equivalence to predicate
devices standard.287 Second, the FDA's finite resources

&

281 Id. at 926.
282 Id.
283 A Delicate Balance: FDA and the Reform of the Medical
Device Approval Process: Hearing Before the Special Committee
on Aging, 112th Cong. 81-107 (2011) (statement of Ralph Hall,
Distinguished Professor, University of Minnesota Law School);
see also Recalls Background and Definitions, U.S. FOOD
DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/safety/industry-guidancerecalls/recalls-background-and-definitions (last visited Nov 3,
2019) ("Class I recall: a situation in which there is a reasonable
probability that the use of or exposure to a violative product
will cause serious adverse health consequences or death.").
284 1M, supra note 20, at 4.
285 Id. at 1, 7-8.
286 Id. at 5-6.
287

Id.
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would be better invested in the development of integrated
pre-market and post-market regulatory frameworks that
provide a reasonable assurance of safety and
effectiveness throughout the device's life cycle rather
than in the current 501(k) process. 288
B. Pre-market Approval Reforms
Critics have proposed a number of solutions aimed
at addressing the problems that plague the FDA's
current pre-market approval process. 289 First, they have
argued that the FDA should completely rewrite its premarket
medical
device
regulations. 290
These
commentators base that conclusion on an independent
assessment of the FDA process that was conducted
pursuant to the MDUFA. 29 1 They concede, however, that
the FDA is highly unlikely to completely rewrite its
medical device regulations. 292

Second, certain reformers maintain that the FDA
ought to privatize its pre-market approval processes and

delegate all pre-market approval determinations to third
parties reviewers. 293 Proponents of this reform argue that
288 IOM, supra note 20, at 8.
289 Stephanie P. Fekete, Litigating Medical Device Premarket
ClassificationDecisions for Small Businesses: Have the Courts
Given the FDA Too Much Deference? The Case for Taking the
Focus Off of Efficacy, 65 CATH. U.L. REV. 605, 626 (2016).
290
Id.; Christa Altenstetter, US Perspectiveson the EUMedical
Devices Approval System, andLessons Learnedfrom the United
States, 4 Eur. J. of Risk Reg. 443, 447 (2013).
291 Fekete, supra 289, at 623, 626; MDUFA II/II EvaluationPriorityRecommendations, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Dec. 11,
2013),

http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulati
onandGDeviceR/Overview/MDUFAIII/UCM378202.pdf.
292 Fekete, supra 289, at 627.
2 93
Id. at 628; see also Elizabeth C. Price, Teaching the Elephant
to Dance: Privatizingthe FDA Review Process, 51 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 651, 653-54 (1996).
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the privatization of pre-market medical device review
would permit FDA to allocate its finite resources to other
agency functions while ensuring that devices are safe and
effective. 294 They view the FDA's current regulatory
structure for medical devices as "perpetuating the FDA
monopoly, with its resulting delays, inefficiency, and
suboptimal allocation of scarce societal resources [and]
an anachronistic vestige of a big government is better
government mentality." 2 95 Under the guise of innovation,
these reformers seek to inject a healthy dose of
competition into FDA product review with the aim of
speeding up the approval and clearance of potentially

life-saving products. 2 96 However, as discussed below,
prioritizing speed over patient safety is likely to simply

exacerbate the current problems with the FDA's medical
device regulatory system.

IV. Recommendations
History instructs that it takes major public health
crises - like the Elixir Sulfanilamide disaster or the
Dalkon Shield controversy - to provoke Congress to
allocate additional authority to the FDA to regulate
medical products. 297 The same history teaches that
medical product manufacturers always push back on
those regulatory reforms and, unfortunately, the agency
tends to bend to corporate will by easing regulatory
reforms over time. 298

As noted above, Congress intended the 510(k)
pathway to apply to a very narrow group of medical

devices when it created that pathway as an alternative to
full PMA review. 299 In the name of innovation, however,
294

Id. at 666.
295 Price, supranote 293, at 652-653.
296
Id. at 676.
297 See Ballentine, supra note 53; Krismann, supra note 67.
298 The Editorial Board, supra note 230.
299 IOM, supra note 20, at 223.
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the 510(k) pathway has evolved from a narrow exception
to PMA review to the general rule that permits the vast
majority of devices to be marketed without clinical
trials.30 0

The FDA's ASR adverse event reporting system
provides another relevant data point.30 1 In this context,
the FDA created a reporting system that permitted
device manufacturers to hide from public disclosure of
adverse events related to medical devices.30 2 The FDA
claims the ASR Program allowed the agency to review
reports of well-known, well-understood adverse events
more efficiently and, thereby, focus its resources on
identifying and taking action on new safety signals and
less understood risks.3 03 The ASR system, however,
shielded at least 1.1 million medical device-related
adverse incidents from public view.3 0 4 While FDA finally
has discontinued the ASR reporting program, the agency
continues to refuse to mandate that manufacturers
report malfunctioning medical devices incidents.3 0 5
It further warrants mention that FDA compliance
and enforcement actions have plummeted since
President Donald J. Trump's inauguration.3 0 6 A study

found that enforcement actions from the FDA Center for
Devices and Radiological Health, which is responsible for
regulating medical devices, have dropped by more than
two-thirds since 2016.307 This is particularly troubling
given that there have been more than 1.7 million

300 Id

301 Shuren, supra note 212.
302 Id.

303

Id

304 Jewett, supra note 214.

305 Shuren, supra note 212.
306 Charles Piller, Exclusive: FDA enforcement actionsplummet

under Trump, SCIENCE (Jul. 2, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.sci
encemag.org/news/2019/07/exclusive-fda-enforcement-actionsplummet-under-trump.
307 Id.
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documented injuries and nearly 83,000 deaths linked to
a problematic medical devices over the last decade.30 8
The bottom line is that we are in the throes of a medical
device public health crisis. Time after time, Congress and
the FDA have put the interests of medical device
manufacturers ahead of those of the American public
and, by so doing, have abdicated their collective
responsibility to protect the public health.3 09 As the
history of medical product regulation makes clear, it is
beyond time the American public calls out for meaningful
reforms.
A. Third Party Review Boards

As explained above, FDA currently allows device
manufacturers to submit medical device applications to
an external third party under the 510(k) Third Party
Review Program.3 1 0 The FDA, on the other hand, rarely
elects to send PMA medical device applications to
external third parties for review. 311 As such, this paper
advocates that FDA develop and implement an objective
standard that triggers a third-party review for both
510(k) and PMA applications-in lieu of the current
process that simply permits manufacturers to self-select
and FDA to elect to refuse external review without any
articulable criteria.
FDA's rationale for refusing to require a thirdparty review for most devices is similar to its 510(k)'s
substantial equivalence theory reasoning and goes as

follows: 31 2 so long as the FDA believes that it understands
the issues relating to the safety and effectiveness of a
predicate device and has developed the ability to address
308 Hallman, supra note 216.

What We Do, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/
about-fda/what-we-do (last visited Nov 10, 2019).
309

310
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311
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312
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those issues, future PMA applications for similar devices
need not be brought before an external panel.31 3 Given
their heighten risk to human health, however, this Paper
argues that FDA ought to require that new Class II and
III

devices

undergo

pre-market

third-party

review

without exception. Under this proposal, the FDA remains
free to accept or reject a third-party panel's
recommendation regarding a PMA or 510(k) application
so long as the agency provides a public rationale for that
decision. 314
As pointed out earlier, the FDA no longer
publishes its rationale for accepting or rejecting PMA or
510(k) device applications in the Federal Register.3 15 This
paper, therefore, further recommends that the FDA
reinstate the requirement that it publish all medical
device approvals-and their supporting rationales-in

the Federal Register. Such action will permit the public
to understand why the FDA approved a medical device
notwithstanding a third-party panel recommendation to
keep the product off of the market. This proposed reform
also will provide device manufacturers the bases for the
FDA's decisions on their applications. Should the FDA
fail to give a thorough description of those bases on an
application it denies, the affected manufacturer could sue
the FDA for violating its own regulations under
traditional principles of administrative law.
B. Adverse Reporting

The FDA's current definition of an "adverse
device-related event" that triggers an agency report is

vague

and

regulation

demands

requires

clarification.

certain

entities

Current

FDA

to report

"any

information, including professional, scientific, or medical
facts, observations, or opinions, [that] may reasonably
313

Kanovsky, supra note 90, at 240.

314 FDLI Report, supra note 132.

315 Kanovsky, supra note 90, at 240.
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suggest that a device has caused or may have caused or
contributed to an MDR reportable event."3 16 It is unclear,
however, what constitutes a "reasonable suggestion"
under the current regulation and it does not appear that
the FDA has ever held a manufacturer liable for ignoring
such a suggestion. For example, is the rule triggered

where one patient who has received an implant reports
severe
post-surgical
discomfort
to the
device
manufacturer? Or is the rule triggered when a provider
who uses a medical device routinely in surgery informs a
device manufacturer or user facility that ten patients
have reported severe post-surgical discomfort? It is
difficult to answer these questions with authority under
the current regulatory scheme. As a result, this Paper
contends that the FDA should convene health
professionals to clearly define what constitutes a
"reasonable suggestion."

For example, if a post-surgical

patient who has serious complications that appear
related to the device and the provider has ruled out all
possible causes is enough to reasonably suggest that an
issue has arisen with the device, then this could
constitute a "reasonable suggestion."
This paper also recommends that the FDA extend
mandatory, medical device-related,
adverse event
reporting to all state-licensed medical professionals that
employ medical devices in their practice. Currently, "any
practitioner who is licensed by law to prescribe or
administer devices intended for use in humans and who
manufactures or imports devices solely for use in the
course of his professional practice" is exempt from the
mandatory reporting of medical device-related adverse
events to the FDA. 317 Physicians, physical therapists,
psychologists, and other health professionals work
directly with patients. As a result, they are often the first
to know if a medical device appears to be malfunctioning
or causing other complications that could lead to an
316

317

21 C.F.R.
21 U.S.C.

§ 803.20(c)(1).
§ 360i(c).
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adverse event. Congress should amend the FDCA to
include a mandatory device-related adverse event
reporting requirement for health professionals consistent
AMA's Code of Medical Ethics.
This new mandatory

reporter rule,

however,

ought to reflect the reality that different health
professionals use different classes of medical devices in
their respective practices and that those devices present
varying levels of risks to patients. For example, given the
low risk that Class I devices pose to human health, there
is no need for Congress to impose a mandatory reporting

requirement on health care providers related to that
categories of devices. Given the heightened risk to human
health that attend to Class II devices, on the other hand,
Congress should require mandatory health professional
reporting related to those products so long as the use of
said devices constitutes 25% or more of the professional's
practice. Finally, because Class III devices pose the
highest risk to human health, Congress should require
all health professionals to report any adverse event
relating to those medical devices to the agency.
Under current FDA regulations, if a user facility
or manufacturer receives information from someone who
is "qualified to make a medical judgment" and that
individual reasonably concludes that a device did not
cause or contribute to a death or serious injury, or that a
malfunction would not be likely to cause or contribute to
a death or serious injury if it were to recur neither is
required to report that information to FDA.3 18 This rule,
however, ignores the conflict of interest that arises when
mandatory reporters are permitted to rely on the
determination of individuals that they choose and, often,
compensate to determine whether to make a report. This
paper proposes that FDA amend its regulations to

eliminate this conflict of interest-riddled loophole and
require user facilities and device manufacturers to report
to FDA any suspicion, at a minimum regarding Class III
318
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devices, that their medical device has malfunctioned or
caused or contributed to an adverse event.
Finally, this paper recommends that FDA
Summary
eliminate the
Voluntary Malfunction
Reporting (VMSR) program. As detailed above, VMSR
encourages manufacturers to voluntarily report certain
device malfunctions to the FDA in summary form on a
quarterly basis.3 1 While the FDA requires device
manufacturers to report device-related deaths or serious
injuries to the agency within 30 days, this program leaves
it to the manufacturer's discretion whether to report
device malfunctions. 320
Device malfunctions serve as a significant
indication that the device is defective and could harm
human health. One need not look any further than
Boston Scientific's ICDs Lead Device as a recent example.

As a result, FDA should require device manufacturers to
submit device malfunction reports to the agency as soon
as possible to ensure the safety and effectiveness of the
device.
C. Supplements and Grandfathering
In 2007, Steve Jobs introduced the world to the
very first iPhone. 32 1 The original iPhone was heralded as
a technological revolution but it lacked even basic picture
messaging and video creation capabilities. 322 The
recently-released iPhone 11, by contrast, includes a
three-camera system with a new ultrawide-angle lens

319

Shuren, supra note 212

3201d.
321

Rob Price, The first iPhone went on sale 10 years ago today

- here's how Steve Jobs announced it, BUSINESS INSIDER (June
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that has the ability to take high quality video. 323 The
iPhone's video imagining capability provides a simple
demonstration of how quickly and dramatically
technology can evolve in just a dozen years.
FDA's 510(k) pathway processes, however,
entirely ignore this reality. As illustrated above, the FDA
allows device manufacturers to avoid a thorough review
of new medical devices by relying on predicate devices
that the FDA cleared for market as far back as 1975 and
without conducting clinical trials on those new devices. 324
Worse yet, the FDA in no manner restricts the number of
PMA supplements a device manufacturer is entitled to
submit that similarly relies on dated device technology so
long as the manufacturer follows current FDA rules.
This paper argues that the FDA should it amend
its rules to preclude device manufacturers from relying
on predicate devices that are more than 10 years old in
510(k) and PMA supplement applications. The FDA also
should require device manufacturers to submit clinical
data that demonstrates the safety and effectiveness of
any proposed "major change" to a medical device prior to
approval. This paper recommends that the FDA defines
a "major change" as any change in a device that increases
its danger to human health.
V. Conclusion
Medical devices are modern day miracles that
continue to impact the lives of millions of Americans. The
U.S. Food and Drug Administration is responsible for
protecting the public health by ensuring the safety,

efficacy, and security of those devices. In the 43 years
since the enactment of the MDA, a number of national
323 Nilay Patel, Apple iPhone 11 review: the phone most people
should buy, THE VERGE (Sept. 17, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://w
ww.theverge.com/2019/9/17/20869456/apple-iphone-11review-camera-price-budget-battery-screen-size-features.
324 21 U.S.C. § 360(k).
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public health emergencies have motivated Congress to
expand the FDA's authority to regulate medical devices.
Device manufactures, however, have always decried
additional regulation and, too often, the FDA has
succumbed to manufacturer interests. The 510(k)
pathways, the PMA Supplement pathway, and the ASR
reporting system are all examples of how the FDA has
developed
expedient,
industry-favorable
review
processes at the expense of public health and safety.
Over the last decade, faulty or flawed medical
devices have injured 1.7 million and killed nearly 83,000
people nationwide. The country's current medical device
safety crisis is directly tied to the FDA's regulation of
those products. The FDA must restore the public trust by
implementing transparent and effective regulatory
reforms to address this medical device safety crisis.
First, the FDA should reinstate the requirement
that it publish all medical device approvals - and their
in the Federal Register.
supporting rationales Furthermore, in the spirit of ensuring the public that the
FDA is concerned primarily with patient safety, the FDA
must extend mandatory, medical device related adverse
event reporting to state-licensed medical professionals
that employ certain medical devices in their practice.
Finally and while the timely introduction of lifesaving
medical products is admittedly a worthy objective, the
FDA must amend its rules to preclude device
manufacturers from relying on predicate devices that are
more than 10 years old in new device 510(k) and PMA
supplement

applications

and

require

device

manufacturers to submit clinical data for major changes
that affect device safety and effectiveness. These reforms
will become all the more critical as technology advances
and the pressure to deregulate continues.

[399]
56

ATTACK OF THE

CLONES

15 TENN. J.L. & POLY

344 (2021)

[400]
57

